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Accountants and the Securities Act *
By Spencer Gordon

The securities act of 1933 has already been the subject of wide
discussion. Its provisions have been analyzed and its historical
and philosophical basis expounded on many occasions. It has
elicited vigorous criticism and equally vigorous defense.
But the articles that I have seen contain little mention of the
duties and liabilities of accountants. We read at length of the
effect of the act upon the financial interests and upon the public,
but the difficulties imposed upon accountants are of too technical
and special a nature to warrant extended mention in articles deal
ing generally with the statute. In this address I shall direct
myself particularly to the problems of accountants, the origin and
extent of their responsibility, the defenses available to them in
case of suit and the extent of their liability. I shall thus hope to
avoid a repetition of much that has been ably said by others and
to deal more thoroughly with the parts of the statute which have
particular relation to the accounting profession.
When Responsibility Attaches
The statute provides for the registration of securities with the
federal trade commission by the filing of “registration state
ments” in regard to such securities.
No suit can be brought under the statute against an accountant
as such unless he—
“. . . has with his consent been named as having prepared or
certified any part of the registration statement, or as having pre
pared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connec
tion with the registration statement, ...” (Section 11 (a) (4).)

See also section 7 in regard to filing the written consent of the
accountant so named.

Extent of Responsibility
Section 11 (a) (4) provides for suits against an accountant
only—
“. . . with respect to the statement in such registration state
ment, report or valuation which purports to have been prepared
or certified by him;”
*An address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants, at New
Orleans, Oct. 17,1933.
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The officers and directors of the issuing corporation who sign
the registration statement and the directors upon whom liability
is imposed by the act may be sued with respect to any part of the
registration statement. The accountant, however, may be sued
only with respect to the statement in such registration statement,
report or valuation which purports to have been prepared or certi
fied by him. He is not responsible for any other part of the
registration statement.

Basis of Suit

Section 11 (a) provides for suit—
“ In case any part of the registration statement, when such part
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material
fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis
leading, ...”

Section 8 provides that the effective date of a registration state
ment shall be the twentieth day after the filing thereof, with
certain exceptions and with further provisions relating to amend
ments, inaccurate statements, etc. It is apparent that any
attempt at literal enforcement of the provisions of section 11 (a)
would create an impossible situation, in that, while provision
may be made to insure the truth or untruth of statements when
they are made or up to the time that a document containing such
statements leaves the control of the maker, it is manifestly im
possible for anyone except a prophet to make accurate statements
of what facts will be twenty days later. This has resulted in the
promulgation of article 15 of the commission’s regulations, which
provides that the statement—

“shall be dated and shall state that such accountant . . . does
believe at the time of the date of such certificate that the state
ments therein are true . . .
“If anything comes to the attention of such accountant or
other expert, or he obtains knowledge of any facts before the
effective date of registration which would make any of the mate
rial items therein untrue or indicate that there was an omission
to state a material fact required to be stated or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading, he shall bring such im
mediately to the attention of the commission.”
Volumes might be written as to what is “a material fact”
within the meaning of section 11 (a). The American Law In
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stitute has recently issued its Restatement of the Law of Contracts.
In chapter 15 on fraud and misrepresentation this statement is
made:
“Where a misrepresentation would be likely to affect the con
duct of a reasonable man with reference to a transaction with
another person, the misrepresentation is material . .
Relying on this definition I may venture to say that a “mate
rial fact” within the meaning of this section 11 (a) is a fact the
untrue statement or omission of which would be likely to affect
the conduct of a reasonable man with reference to the acquisition,
holding or disposal of the security in question.
The term “registration statement” is defined in section 2 (8)
as including—
“. . . any amendment thereto and any report, document, or
memorandum accompanying such statement or incorporated
therein by reference.”
Thus any certificate, report and/or valuation accompanying the
registration statement would be held a part thereof and might
be the basis of a suit.
Who May Sue—Limitation—Waiver

Under section 11 (a)—
“. . . any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that
at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omis
sion) may . . . sue—.”

By section 2 (2) the word “person” is defined as including an
individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a jointstock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization or a
government or political subdivision thereof. Suit may be brought
under section 11 (a) not only by such a person acquiring the
security at the time of the original offering to the public but by
any such person who may acquire the security at any time there
after—
“unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of
such untruth or omission.”
In order to maintain such a suit the person acquiring the security
does not have to show that he was misled by the incorrect state
ment or omission, nor does he have to show that he relied on or
even that he ever read the registration statement or any part of
440
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it. Unless he actually knows of the untruth or omission, he may
purchase the security blindly, and if he later discovers a material
misstatement or omission in the registration statement he can
take advantage of this as the basis for his suit. The statute places
the burden on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff knew of
the untruth or omission at the time he purchased the security.
The plaintiff does not have to negative this as part of his affirma
tive case. If, however, the defendant does prove such knowledge
on the part of the plaintiff, it is a complete defense to the suit
allowed by the act.
The only limitation on such a suit is contained in section 13
providing that—
“No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created
under section 11 . . . unless brought within two years after the
discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence . . . In no event . . . more than ten years after the
security was bona fide offered to the public.”

Section 14 provides that—
“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision
of this title or of the rules and regulations of the commission
shall be void.”
This probably invalidates only a condition, stipulation or
provision which has been agreed to by the person acquiring the
security in connection with such acquisition. It would hardly
be held to mean that a competent person who had once acquired
a security could not later, with full knowledge of the facts, give a
release of liability or agree to any other condition, stipulation or
provision.
Defenses
By section 11 (b) certain defenses are allowed, in addition to
proof that the plaintiff at the time of the acquisition of the
security knew of the untruth or omission:
“. . . that before the effective date of the part of the registra
tion statement . . . (A) he had . . . ceased ... to act in
every . . . relationship in which he was described in the registra
tion statement as acting or agreeing to act, and (B) he had ad
vised the commission and the issuer in writing that he had taken
such action and that he would not be responsible for such part of
the registration statement.” (Section 11 (b) (1).)
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While this provision seems to relate primarily to resignations
by directors, etc., its language is broad enough to cover the case
of the accountant. If an accountant gains any knowledge which
makes him wish to repudiate the matter attributed to him before
the effective date of the registration statement, he can do so and
can escape liability by advising the commission and the issuer in
writing that he has ceased to act in the relationship of accountant
and that he will not be responsible for the part of the registration
certificate attributed to him:
. that if such part of the registration statement became
effective without his knowledge, upon becoming aware of such
fact he forthwith acted and advised the commission, in accord
ance with paragraph (1), and, in addition, gave reasonable public
notice that such part of the registration statement had become
effective without his knowledge;” (Section 11 (b) (2).)

In the case of the accountant it probably would be unusual for
the part of the registration statement attributed to him to become
effective without his knowledge, in view of the fact that his writ
ten consent is required to be filed under section 7. But such a
situation might arise, for example, where the accountant’s con
sent had been 'forged or had been filed in violation of an agree
ment to hold it pending further examination of some phase of the
registration statement. In such case he may escape liability in
the manner indicated:
“. . . as regards any part of the registration statement pur
porting to be made upon his authority as an expert or purporting
to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of himself as
an expert, (i) he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the
registration statement became effective, that the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a mate
rial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, or (ii) such part of the registra
tion statement did not fairly represent his statement as an expert
or was not a fair copy of or extract from his report or valuation as
an expert;” (Section 11 (b) (3) (B).)

This provision deals with the situation which will usually be
presented in a suit against an accountant and the defense which
will usually be made. Whether or not such a defense will suc
ceed will depend, not upon whether the accountant himself be
lieved that he made a reasonable examination, but upon whether
the court or the jury under directions from the court determines
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that the examination was in fact reasonable in the light of all the
evidence in the case. The accountant can testify as an expert as
to what he believes is a reasonable investigation and what the
practice of accountants is in that regard, and he can produce
other accountants to give substantiating testimony, but all that
will be admissible only as evidence of what in fact is a reasonable
investigation. The same is true of the question of whether the
accountant “had reasonable ground to believe and did believe.”
Those are questions of fact. What the accountants may testify
is admissible in evidence, but it is not conclusive.
Thus although the accountant involved may testify that he
made what was in his opinion a reasonable investigation and that
in his opinion he had reasonable ground to believe, and in fact did
believe, that the statements were correct, nevertheless the court
or jury, whichever has the duty of determining the facts in a
particular case, may find from all the evidence that the accountant
has not sustained the burden of proof upon any one or all of these
points and that he has not established that he made reasonable
investigation, that he had reasonable ground to believe and/or
that he did in fact believe.
The defense that the part of the registration statement which
is involved in the suit did not fairly represent the accountant’s
statement as an expert or was not a fair copy of or an extract
from his report or valuation as an expert is self-explanatory.
Whether this defense has been established will also be a question
of fact. Expert testimony will be desirable in many cases, but
will not be conclusive:
“. . . as regards any part of the registration statement pur
porting to be made on the authority of an expert (other than
himself) or purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or
valuation of an expert (other than himself), he had reasonable
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the
registration statement became effective, that the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a mate
rial fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, and that such part of the
registration statement fairly represented the statement of the
expert or was a fair copy of or extract from the report or valuation
of the expert;” (Section 11 (b) (3) (C).)

The application of this subsection to the accountant appears to
be as follows: Under section 11 (a) (4) he can be sued only with
respect to matter which purports to have been prepared or certi443
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fled by him. But in a balance-sheet or profit-and-loss statement
certified by an accountant there may be items as to which he
indicates that he in turn has relied upon another expert. As to
such items, section 11 (b) (3) (C) is a defense if the accountant
had reasonable ground to believe and in fact did believe that they
were true, etc., and that they fairly represented the statement of
the expert, etc.
. . as regards any part of the registration statement pur
porting to be a statement made by an official person or purporting
to be a copy of or extract from a public official document, he had
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such
part of the registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true, and that there was no omission to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading, and that such part
of the registration statement fairly represented the statement
made by the official person or was a fair copy of or extract from
the public official document.” (Section 11 (b) (3) (D).)

Although this subsection would ordinarily be applicable to
others than accountants, it is possible that the accountant’s
certificate may in part purport to be a statement made by an
official person or a copy of or extract from a public official docu
ment. In such case the accountant will not be held for errors of
fact in the statement or document if he had reasonable ground to
believe and did believe that the statements were true, etc., and
that the official statement or document was fairly represented in
the registration statement.
As to each of these defenses the accountant is required to “sus
tain the burden of proof” (Section 11 (b)). In a trial the burden
of proof is ordinarily upon the plaintiff. In all suits brought
under section 11 the plaintiff must therefore sustain the burden of
proof that there has been, in the part of the registration statement
attributed to the accountant, an untrue statement of a material
fact or the omission to state a material fact required to be stated
in the registration statement or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, and the plaintiff must also sustain the
burden of proof that he has acquired such security, and that the
accountant has with his consent been named as having prepared
or certified the statement which is the subject of the suit. If the
plaintiff establishes these facts, the burden of proof is imposed on
the defendant to establish the defenses allowed under section 11
(b). The term “burden of proof” has been discussed in in
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numerable cases. Perhaps as good a definition as can be found
is contained in the old New Hampshire case of Lisbon v. Lyman,
49 N. H. 553, 563, where Chief Justice Doe said:
“The burden of proof (in this case on the subject of emancipa
tion) was on the plaintiff; and this burden was not sustained,
unless the plaintiff proved it by a preponderance of all the evi
dence introduced on the subject. But it was not necessary for
the plaintiff to produce anything more than the slightest pre
ponderance . . . Before any evidence was introduced, the scales
in which the jury were to weigh the evidence were exactly bal
anced ; if they remained so after all the evidence was introduced,
emancipation was not proved; if they tipped ever so little, in
favor of the plaintiff, emancipation was proved.”

Standard

of

Reasonableness

Section 11 (c) provides:
“ In determining, for the purpose of paragraph (3) of subsection
(b) of this section, what constitutes reasonable investigation
and reasonable ground for belief, the standard of reasonable
ness shall be that required of a person occupying a fiduciary
relationship.”
Broadly speaking, a person occupying a fiduciary relationship
is in the position of a trustee, and the duties of trustees have
often been the subject of judicial expression. In tentative draft
No. 2 of the American Law Institute’s restatement of the law of
trusts, section 169, the following appears:

“The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering
the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary pru
dence would exercise in dealing with his own property; and if the
trustee has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence,
he is under a duty to exercise such skill as he has.
“Comments:
“a. The standard of care and skill required of a trustee is the
external standard of a man of ordinary prudence in dealing with
his own property. A trustee is liable for a loss resulting from his
failure to use the care and skill of a man of ordinary prudence,
although he may have exercised all the care and skill of which he
was capable.
*****
“b. Whether the trustee is prudent in the doing of an act
depends upon the circumstances as they reasonably appear to
him at the time when he does the act and not at some subsequent
time when his conduct is called in question.”
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In the conference report on the securities act of 1933, H. R. report
No. 152, 73rd congress, 1st session, appears the following:
"The standard by which reasonable care was exemplified was
expressed in terms of the fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary
under the law is bound to exercise diligence of a type commen
surate with the confidence, both as to integrity and competence,
that is placed in him. This does not, of course, necessitate that
he shall individually perform every duty imposed upon him.
Delegation to others of the performance of acts which it is un
reasonable to require that the fiduciary shall personally perform
is permissible. Especially is this true where the character of the
acts involves professional skill or facilities not possessed by the
fiduciary himself. In such cases reliance by the fiduciary, if his
reliance is reasonable in the light of all the circumstances, is a
full discharge of his responsibilities.”

Section 11 (c) is, however, a very difficult section to construe in
its relation to the accountant, because we have had no previous ex
perience of an accountant as such acting in a fiduciary relationship.
"The performance of the duties of a trustee requires the exer
cise of a high degree of fidelity, vigilance and ability. Especially
is this true when the trustee is a company organized for the pur
pose of caring for trust estates, which holds itself out as possessing
a special skill in the performance of the duties of a trustee, and
which makes a charge for its services which adequately com
pensates it for a high degree of fidelity and ability in the ad
ministration of a trust estate.”—Estate of Allis, 191 Wis. 23.
As the accountant holds himself out as possessing a special
skill in the performance of his duties, and as he performs these
duties for compensation, if he is to be held to the standard of per
sons occupying a fiduciary relationship he must exercise a high
degree of fidelity, vigilance and ability. Until the section in
question has been construed by the courts, I can only say that it
seems to increase the measure of precaution that the accountant
must exercise to fulfill his duty of reasonable care. He should
approach his work as though he were auditing a transaction
involving the funds of a widow or minor child for whom he is the
guardian or trustee.

Extent of Liability

Section 11 further provides:
" (e) The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be either
(1) to recover the consideration paid for such security with in
terest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
446

Accountants and the Securities Act
upon the tender of such security, (2) or for damages if the person
suing no longer owns the security.”

The first branch of this subsection contemplates a suit brought
by a person still holding the security. Upon tender of the security
to the person sued, he may recover the consideration paid,
with interest from date of payment, less the amount of any
dividends or other income received from the security. There is
no requirement that the plaintiff be one who acquired the stock
at the original offering. Any subsequent purchaser still holding
the security may sue under the section.
The liability thus imposed upon the accountant may be largely
unrelated to and greatly in excess of any damage caused by the
accountant’s error. For example, in a $1,000,000 stock issue,
the accountant may have made an untrue statement of a material
fact by omitting to mention liabilities of $100,000, which in the
average case would presumably have affected the value of the
securities, when issued, to the extent of ten per cent. By reason
of ensuing business conditions the stock which sold for $1,000,000,
and in the average case should have sold for $900,000, had the
accountant been correct in his statement, may fall on the stock
exchange to a total value of $100,000, the stock which was issued
at 100 then selling at 10. In this situation the holders of the
stock may tender it to the accountant and require him to pay the
consideration that they have given for it with the adjustments
heretofore mentioned, so that if all the original purchasers still
have their stock the accountant will have to pay approximately
$1,000,000 and will receive stock worth only $100,000, a net
penalty to the accountant of $900,000, although his error only
affected the stock to the extent of $100,000.
The second branch of the subsection allowing “damages if the
person suing no longer owns the security” apparently does not
impose as clear a liability as the recovery of consideration ex
pressly provided in section 11 (e) (1). In order to be consistent
with that section, we should expect a provision somewhat as
follows:
“or (2) to recover damages, equal to the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount received for
the security and any income received thereon, if the person suing
no longer owns the security.”

This would have placed the person who no longer owns the
security in the same position as to ability to recover damages as
447
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the person who still holds the security. But the act does not so
provide, and, if this ambiguity is not obviated by subsequent
legislation, it may be held, in a suit by a person who no longer
owns the security, that only real damages can be recovered—that
is, damages which are the natural result of the untrue statement
or of the omission and can be traced to the error of the accountant.
In the absence of clear language imposing such a liability, the
courts should be slow to give "damages” which are caused by
subsequent economic and market conditions and are not caused
by the act of the person sued.
It is interesting to note, however, that Felix Frankfurter, a
distinguished lawyer who is reputed to be one of the authors of
the act, in an article in Fortune for August, 1933, seems to con
sider that the damages will include the full loss to the investor
whether caused by the accountant’s error or by subsequent events.
His article states in part:
“When circumstances permit suit, the investor, on tender of
the security, may recover the consideration he paid, or damages if
he has parted with the security. Since the remedy is in the
nature of a rescission, it avoids the inquiry, practically impossible,
as to the extent of the damages due to the misrepresentation and
the extent due to other causes. To force the injured party to
disentangle these items of damage would impose upon him an
unfair burden in litigation. Where a material misrepresentation
has been made, it is not for those who have been guilty of bad
faith or incompetence or recklessness to put the buyer to proof
that his bargain was not bad for still other causes.”

Section 11 contains a further provision:
“ (g) In no case shall the amount recoverable under this section
exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public.”
The effect of this provision in a suit under section 11 (e) (1) is
reasonably clear. Such a suit is to recover the consideration paid
for the security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received therefrom, upon the tender of such security.
Under section 11 (g) if the consideration paid, with the adjust
ments provided, is greater than the price at which the security
was offered to the public, the amount recoverable under section
11 (e) (1) is reduced to such price.
But when we attempt to determine the effect of section 11 (g)
on suits for damages under section 11 (e) (2) if the person suing
no longer owns the security, a difficult question is presented. If
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the courts hold that the damages recoverable are only such dam
ages as are the natural result of the untrue statement or of the
omission, there would appear to be no reason for the application
of section 11 (g) in a section 11 (e) (2) case, as such damages could
hardly exceed the price at which the security was offered to the
public. But if the courts hold that the remedy of damages given
by section 11 (e) (2) should be construed in such a way that the
person who has parted with the security has a remedy equivalent
to the remedy of recovery of consideration expressly given by sec
tion 11 (e) (1) to the person who still holds the security, then
section 11 (g) may affect such a suit for damages in either of two
ways, depending on whether the courts attempt to give a con
struction which will make the section consistent or whether they
follow the literal words of section 11 (g).
1. In order to make the remedies provided by section 11 (e)
(1) and 11 (e) (2) entirely consistent, section 11 (g) should be
construed to mean that in a suit for damages the measure of
recovery shall be based not upon the consideration actually paid for
the security but upon the price at which the security was offered
to the public if that was less than the consideration paid. Such a
construction would make section 11 (e) (1) and (2) and section 11
(g) consistent with the express provisions of section 11 (e) (1) and
with the clear application of section 11 (g) to section 11 (e) (1).
2. If, however, section 11 (g) is construed literally, the only
provision we find is that the amount recoverable shall not exceed
“the price at which the security was offered to the public,” and
under a literal construction there is apparently no limit to the
possible liability. For example, a security might be offered to
the public at 100, subsequently purchased by the plaintiff at 200
and sold again at 100. The 100 lost by that particular plaintiff
would not exceed the price at which the security was offered to
the public. In the case of a fluctuating security with an active
market there may be an infinite number of such purchasers who
have sustained such losses, in each case up to but not beyond the
price at which the security was originally offered to the public.
As the same share of stock may be sold again and again as the
quotations go up and down, the total of these losses may be more
than the total amount at which the issue was originally sold to
the public and may in fact be infinite in amount. Although this
construction must be recognized as a possibility, I think that it is
improbable that the courts will so hold, because it involves the
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reading of language into section 11 (e) (2) to make it harmonize
with section 11 (e) (1), but the refusal to continue the harmonizing
process by reading anything into section 11 (g).
Other Remedies Reserved
By section 16 it is provided:
“The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in ad
dition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law or in equity.”

In Ultramares Corporation v. Touche et al., 255 N. Y. 170, it
was held that an accountant was liable for negligence only to one
with whom he was in privity of contract, but that his liability for
fraud ran to any person injured by such fraud, and there might
be negligence so gross as to be evidence of fraud. Not involved in
this case, but well established at common law, are the principles
that the injury must be caused by a reliance on the act of the
accountant, and that the damages recoverable must be the nat
ural consequence of the accountant’s negligence or fraud.
Under the securities act of 1933, in regard to the parts of the
registration statement attributed to the accountant, with his
consent, the accountant’s liability is greatly broadened:
1. As to the persons who may recover in cases other than those
of fraud: They need have no contractual relationship with the
accountant.
2. As to the injury: This may be caused in part by events other
than the negligence or fraud of the accountant.
3. As to the amount of the damage recoverable: This has been
increased by section 11 (e) (1) and perhaps by section 11 (e) (2).
And “all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in
equity” remain.
Conclusion
In the provisions of the securities act of 1933 and in the author
ities that I have given in support of the views expressed in
this address, there has been much use of the word “reasonable,”
“reasonable investigation,” “reasonable ground to believe,”
“circumstances as they reasonably appear,” “the conduct of a
reasonable man.” Perhaps one may think that I should have
discussed these expressions and should have explained their
meaning, but it seemed to me that it would be more appropriate
to do this in one place and at the conclusion of my address.
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The best definition that I have ever seen of the reasonable man
is contained in a volume entitled Misleading Cases in the Common
Law by A. P. Herbert. I quote from the judgment of Lord Jus
tice Morrow in Fardell v. Potts, at page 12:
“The common law of England has been laboriously built about
a mythical figure—the figure of ‘the reasonable man.’ . . . He
is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all those qualities
which we demand of the good citizen. . . .
“. . . It is impossible to travel anywhere or to travel for long
in that confusing forest of learned judgments which constitutes
the common law of England without encountering the reasonable
man. . . . There has never been a problem, however difficult,
which his majesty’s judges have not in the end been able to resolve
by asking themselves the simple question, ‘Was this or was it not
the conduct of a reasonable man? ’ and leaving that question to be
answered by the jury.
“. . . The reasonable man is always thinking of others; pru
dence is his guide, . . . He is one who invariably looks where
he is going and is careful to examine the immediate foreground
before he executes a leap or a bound; who neither star-gazes nor
is lost in meditation when approaching trapdoors or the margin of
a dock; . . . who never mounts a moving omnibus and does not
alight from any car while the train is in motion; who investigates
exhaustively the bona fides of every mendicant before distributing
alms and will inform himself of the history and habits of a dog
before administering a caress; who believes no gossip, nor repeats
it, without firm basis for believing it to be true; who never drives
his ball till those in front of him have definitely vacated the
putting-green which is his own objective; who never from one
year’s end to another makes an excessive demand upon his wife,
his neighbors, his servants, his ox or his ass; who in the way of
business looks only for that narrow margin of profit which twelve
men such as himself would reckon to be ‘fair,’ and contemplates
his fellow-merchants, their agents, and their goods with that
degree of suspicion and distrust which the law deems admirable;
who never swears, gambles or loses his temper; who uses nothing
except in moderation and even while he flogs his child is meditat
ing only on the golden mean.
“ Devoid, in short, of any human weakness, with not one single
saving vice, sans prejudice, procrastination, ill-nature, avarice
and absence of mind, as careful for his own safety as he is for
that of others, this excellent but odious character stands like a
monument in our courts of justice, vainly appealing to his fellow
citizens to order their lives after his own example.’’
I leave you with this definition and with the juries which will
be duly empaneled to try any suits arising under the securities act
of 1933.
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